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TOBACCO CONTROL
European watchdog is failing to hold tobacco industry
to account over smuggling
What are agreements with the industry worth?
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For over a decade the European Union’s antifraud organisation,
OLAF (Office Européen de Lutte Antifraude) has,
controversially, engaged with the tobacco industry, ostensibly
to counter tobacco smuggling. This is despite extensive evidence
of industry complicity in smuggling,1 a situation that seems to
persist.2 It also represents a U-turn by OLAF, which in 2000
filed a lawsuit accusing tobacco manufacturers of “an ongoing
global scheme to smuggle cigarettes.”
In 2004 OLAF halted this litigation in exchange for a legally
binding agreement with Philip Morris International to tackle
the illicit trade.3 Subsequently, the European Union signed
similar agreements with three other big tobacco companies. The
agreement with Philip Morris is about to expire, and talks on
possible renewal have begun.
Lack of transparency
These agreements may have undermined OLAF’s judgment.3
Analysis has highlighted a lack of transparency in how the
agreements operated, with growing industry control over data,
making them almost impossible to evaluate. Philip Morris’s
own data indicate that in 2010, six years into the agreement,
almost a quarter of illicit cigarettes in Europe were its brands.4
It is clear that the tobacco industry has not adequately controlled
its supply chain and that the fines detailed in the agreements
are not enough to deter the industry from involvement in illicit
trade.3 4
An investigation made under freedom of information legislation
showed that OLAF had failed to hold the industry to account.
One document dated 3 July 2015 set the tone. In it Philip Morris
noted that it “continues to be extremely pleased with the
operation of the agreement.”5
Other documents may explain PhilipMorris’s pleasure over the
extent of OLAF’s oversight. Although the company promised
to do business only with some approved contractors that had
taken measures to reduce smuggling and to update regularly a
list of such contractors, OLAF requested this list only once, in
2012. There is no record that OLAF ever sought information
on the sales volumes of these approved contractors or on the
due diligence that Philip Morris committed to undertake to
ensure that the contractors were complying with anti-smuggling
measures. Similarly, OLAF seems never to have exercised its
right to interview Philip Morris staff or to ask for information
on the number of cigarettes held in tax or customs warehouses.6
Track and trace
The EU’s Tobacco Products Directive,7 due to come into force
in 2016, requires that all tobacco traded in Europe be identified
by “track and trace” systems from May 2019. The industry has
taken the lead, promoting its own system, Codentify, which has
many weaknesses.8 It makes it impossible to determine when
cigarettes are diverted into the illegal supply chain. The codes
are visible, and it is difficult to tell duplicate from real products.
It seeks to replace government managed tax stamps with an
industry controlled system. Most worryingly, Codentify puts
the industry in control of the system, despite its long history of
involvement in the illicit trade and of manipulating data about
illicit trade.9
Other systems avoid these problems, but the tobacco industry
is lobbying against them.10 Now, OLAF has expressed concern
that any rival technology might disrupt its relationship with the
industry. This is despite accumulating evidence that this
relationship has benefited only the industry.3 It is also despite
the requirement on the EU, as party to the World Health
Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, to
protect its policies from industry influence and to ensure that
track and trace systems are run independently of the industry,
as the head of the convention secretariat has recently reiterated.11
Finally, Philip Morris is challenging the Tobacco Products
Directive in the European Court of Justice. Can OLAF justify
continuing its cooperation with a company whose action, if
successful, would prevent implementation of the EU’s most
important piece of tobacco control legislation in the past decade?
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Given the tobacco industry’s history of misleading the public
over the harms of tobacco, and recent allegations of British
American Tobacco’s involvement in bribery, including the use
of bribery to promote use of Codentify over rival systems,12 it
is inconceivable that any legitimate organisation would give
the industry any credibility at all.
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